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INTRODUCTION
Various aspects of legal procedure are based upon a tacit assump-
tion that a "normal" man can tell the truth if he tries. By implication
this assumes that the major sources of error will be either a mechanical
failure of the brain -to record and reproduce past events, or else a delib-
erate desire to deceive or a reluctance to tell all. It will be my thesis
that these assumptions are invalid: that in spite of every effort to be
honest, the perceiving, recording, processing, reliving and reproducing
of the events one observes and of the events in which one participates
always are selectively colored; that these sources of error are ubiqui-
tous; and that a relatively rare and minor role is played by those errors
which are introduced by deliberate deceit, by mechanical limits of the
brain as a recording apparatus or by organic brain damage. The
disconcerting questions which these facts force upon us are (1) what
role in legal testimony should be played by memory and by discrepancies
-among the memories of different men, and (2) how are courts of law
to proceed, since all testimony depends upon memory?
It should not cause dismay to discover that psychiatry can only
raise these questions; it cannot answer them. Every doctor is familiar
with this predicament. For centuries, before he could offer a cure he
has had to diagnose fatal illnesses as "incurable." Yet he knew all
along that he would never find a cure if he had not first recognized and
acknowledged the existence of the disease. It is not strange then that
all social and behavioral sciences such as the law must frequently
acknowledge the existence of long-standing psycho-social "diseases"
without immediately offering a remedy. This, however, does not
justify complacency over existing methods of dealing with a situation
on the grounds that they are "the best we've got." It should rather
spur us on to find ways which are better.
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The admonition to seek better ways is of particular importance in
relation to the eliciting and evaluation of testimony, since testimony
rests upon one of man's most fallible psychological instruments, his
memory. Without pretending to be exhaustive I will list some of many
ways in which memory is vulnerable. I will begin, however, by citing
a comparable example drawn from another field.
A recent study was made of the process of supervision in psycho-
therapy and of the value of tape recordings for conducting supervision
and studying the psychotherapeutic process. It was pointed out that
we run counter to everything which we have learned about the processes
of the memory when we expect a student conducting therapy to recall
with precision what happened during a therapeutic session and to
reproduce the session undistorted in a subsequent meeting with his
supervisor. It is asking him to record and to recall without bias both
sides of a rapid and free interchange in which he is a participant and
not merely an observer, in which his own complex emotions are
intricately involved, and in which he needs constantly to demonstrate
his ability not merely to observe but also to guide that which he is
observing and to predict that which is to come. In other words, he is
asked to be a carefully disciplined pilot, a free reactor, a participant, an
observer, a recorder, and an objective recounter, all without screening
or bias. The patent absurdity of this demand was the starting point
for the studies which were made with tape recordings.'
In one seminar a young psychiatrist reported that in a previous
session his patient had suddenly asked that the recording machine be
turned off because he was about to divulge some material which was
particularly painful. The seminar group discussed the possible reasons
for this, basing the discussion on their knowledge of the patient gained
in previous meetings. To check the accuracy of their speculations the
group suggested that the five or ten minutes of the therapeutic inter-
view just preceding and following the interruption of the recording be
played back. To the blank astonishment of the young psychiatrist and
of the group as a whole, they heard the psychiatrist himself make the
suggestion to the patient that the recording be interrupted. Of this
fact the psychiatrist had.not the slightest recollection. Yet from the
material that preceded the interruption it became clear that the psy-
chiatrist's intuition had served him well. He had sensed the patient's
mounting tension. He had realized the need for some gesture of special
consideration and privacy. The patient had responded with relief and
after a few minutes had apparently suggested that the recording be
I See Kubie, Research into the Process of Supervision in Psychoanalysis, 27
PSYCHOANYTIC Q. 226 (1958).
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resumed. Nevertheless, the psychiatrist had felt anxious lest he be
criticized for his action; out of this anxiety had come the unconscious
reversal of his memory of events and of the roles which he and the
patient had played.
I should emphasize that these are friendly seminars in which the
young psychiatrists do not feel assaulted by criticism. They value the
opportunity to see themselves at work. Nevertheless, the fact that his
own maneuver had been spontaneous, impulsive and in a sense unusual
had aroused enough guilt and enough fear to make this earnest and able
student unwittingly reverse his memory data. If this can happen under
such friendly circumstances in an intimate postgraduate seminar, then
surely we shall have to take account of similar phenomena in a court
of law.
THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF MEMORY
Failure to Perceive, Record and Recall
One function of psychiatry in relation to other disciplines is re-
peatedly to warn us away from the mistaken supposition that complex
elements in human nature are simple. Accordingly one purpose of this
article is to discuss the complexities of the processes of human memory
and the implications of these complexities for legal procedure. Another
is to provide a starting point for a search for more accurate and, there-
fore, fairer methods of evaluating the memories of witness, of accuser
and of accused.
What we call "memory" actually consists of several components,
each of which is vulnerable to distortion.
(1) Before there is anything to remember there must first have
been a perceptual process. But even elementary perceptions are not
simple acts of automatic registering. Perceptions themselves are selected
under the influence of many processes of which the perceiver is unaware.
Without realizing it we pick and choose among thousands of concurrent
impressions. Moreover, in addition to the unaware -selective influences
which guide our perceptions we actually do a major amount of perceiv-
ing without awareness that we are perceiving at all. This is not an hy-
pothesis. It is a fact that has been demonstrated repeatedly in experi-
mental work, and which also is manifested daily in human life. The
simplest experimental demonstration of the fact that we can perceive
and record without being aware of it has been conducted with the use
of a tachistoscope: a machine which flashes a visual image upon a screen
for such a brief span of time that it is impossible for the individual to
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say what it is that he has seen;. he can report only that it was "a flash
of light with something on it." Subsequently however the influence of
the image which was flashed upon the screen can be traced in spontane-
ous doodlings and drawings, in dreams, in word association tests and
in such physiological components of emotional processes as changes in
skin-temperature, color, sweat, resistance of the skin to the passage of a
weak electrical current, and respiratory and heart rates.
Furthermore, innumerable examples can be adduced of people who
have reproduced words, tunes and visual images which they have
experienced without having noted at the time the fact that they -had
experienced anything out of the ordinary. For example, a young
medical student seated at his desk by an open window hears a friend
whistle to him from the street. This was a prearranged signal to go
for a walk in the country. He approaches his friend whistling; yet
what he whistles is not the tune he heard but another. Moreover, he
is puzzled by the tune he is whistling; he cannot remember its name or
where he has heard it. He whistles the tune to his friend, asking if he
recognizes it. Thereupon the friend answers, "I was whistling that for
half an hour and you paid no attention. I thought you must have gone
out. Then I decided to try again; and this time I whistled another tune
and you put your head out of the window."
In another instance the process of unaware selectivity operated
under more obvious emotional influences. A young man encounters his
psychiatrist at a Saturday night dance. In the course of the evening
they pass each other repeatedly on the crowded dance floor. The young
man looks at and through his analyst repeatedly, giving no sign of
recognition. The psychiatrist thinks that the young man is embarrassed,
and after one or two tentative smiles in his direction refrains from
greeting him. On Monday morning the young man comes to his
session and recounts a dream of having met his psychiatrist at a dance;
he is unable to believe that the event had actually occurred.
Again, towards the end of her analysis a patient who is a poet
dreams of topping a rise on a lovely hillside in spring and of seeing a
valley full of straight, tall green flowers, their bells opening to the sky.
She ends the description saying, "I have never seen anything like them."
Then stopping and pointing at a lamp by the couch in the office she
says, "How long has that been there? Those were the flowers." The
lamp was a relatively new lamp, but it had been there for three weeks.
The patient had walked by it every day of those three weeks and had
looked at it from the couch, recording it and reproducing it in the dream
as the poetic symbol of the approaching end of her treatment. Yet she
had not known that she had seen it.
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What is more, -if individuals are taken into a strange room and,
upon being removed, are asked to write down everything that they
remember seeing, one may write down -twenty items, while another may
recall fifty. But whether on his first trial one remembers few or many,
if the same individual can then be put into a light hypnotic trance and
be asked to write down everything that he saw in the room, he may be
able to recall hundreds of additional items. Clearly he had registered
and recorded them "preconsciously"; but he is not able to reproduce
them until he is put into that half-way state between sleeping and wak-
ing, the state of "communicative sleep" which is called hypnosis.
In fact, thousands of simultaneous impressions, through eyes, ears,
nose, tongue, skin, joints, muscles, apertures, and also from internal
organs pelt us continuously. Some flick against insensitive areas, some
against areas of emotionally sensitive concern. The sting of some of
these will be recorded with pain but with precision. Others which
touch off particularly pleasant sensations will subsequently be remem-
bered with pleasure and with acuity. Still others which touch off
pleasure will be buried because the pleasure was associated with guilt
or with fear. Some which cause pain will be recorded and recalled
with angry indignation; still other painful stings are buried and for-
gotten because of their setting of fear, guilt and shame. Therefore, in
the mere perceiving and recording of such experiences emotional factors
play an automatic selective role at the very moment of perception, thus
determining the degree of awareness with which the individual, as a
whole person, participates in the process of experiencing. Furthermore,
things which are of major emotional importance to John may be of
relatively minor importance to Tom. The one may record them with
fair precision, while the other -may record them only vaguely and
diffusely, if at all.
From these reflections and from countless daily experiences
and carefully controlled laboratory experiments, we must conclude
that all human beings are subject to an incessant bombardment of
sensory experiences and that often they will perceive and store these,
process them internally (and what I mean by that I will describe below),
bury or "forget" them, and reproduce them without ever knowing that
they have experienced them. If they were asked whether they had
ever seen such a lamp, had ever heard such a tune, had ever met their
psychiatrist at a dance, -they would answer quite honestly, "No." This
means that one can be exposed repeatedly to an experience without
conscious knowledge or awareness and without the ability to recall it to
conscious awareness. Such a man will not be lying if he can recall some
inconspicuous detail yet deny having seen some large and conspicuous
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object which was "right under his nose," even when a dozen other
men recollect seeing it. Discrepancies of the sort are not rare or
exceptional. Yet the same man may give many indirect indications
that the experience had been recorded and "processed" on some less-
than-conscious plane; memory traces of the entire experience or of
fragments of it could be elicited by appropriate experimental maneuvers.
What implications this may hold for legal procedures, especially with
regard to testimony and perjury, is a matter of grave concern.
The point is that the recording, storing and reproducing of ex-
perience (i.e., recalling it to conscious memory) are only in small part
mediated by conscious processing, but are under the constant influence
of highly selective preconscious and unconscious influences. Such
preconscious perceptions make up the major share of the daily life of
every human being; in fact, only a small fragment of our life experiences
are mediated by conscious processing.
(2) Similar unconscious and preconscious mechanisms guide the
storing and processing of experience. By this we mean the linking of
one unit of experience to another, which in its primary steps depends
upon the concurrence of more than one perceptual process in any unit
of time. If it were ever possible to experience just one thing at a time,
we would never be able subsequently to recall it. It would be like a
railroad station in an empty field with no rails leading to or from it to
link it to any rail system. In the nervous system the establishment of
connecting links begins with the inevitable concurrent input of simul-
taneous events on a preconscious level. As Pavlov showed, a mere
coincidence in time establishes -these connecting links without which
there could be no such thing as memory.
But this processing of experiences according to their relationships
in time also determines our orientation in time and our time sense.
Moreover, the concurrence of experiences juxtaposes them and makes
possible that element of processing which compares, contrasts and
groups them according to similarities, dissimilarities and contrasting
elements. By means of such instantaneous comparisons we are enabled
to classify experiences in categories and then to represent these cate-
gories by abstractions and memory images. It is this capacity to make
quick comparisons of a present image with a past trace which makes it
possible to remember faces, events, voices, gestures, places, and time-
sequences or time-intervals. Here again, although there is a component
in this processing of perceptual experiences which is carried on con-
sciously, the major share is carried on preconsciously. And, as both
Pavlov and Freud have showed, emotional processes whether conscious
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or unconscious also influence these connecting links and how they will
be used.
(3) This processing and recombining of units of past experience
make possible the re-experiencing or re-living of the past with varying
degrees of vividness. The re-experiencing, again, may be broken down
into a battery of interacting components. One may re-experience
merely the sensory fragments of the past; a pain, an ache, a smell, a
flavor, a color, a scene or a face may come vividly to mind almost as
though it were present. Such sensory components of the past will
combine in varying proportions with memory traces of the sensations
received from the external surfaces of the body and limbs (exterocep-
tive) and from movements of muscles and joints (proprioceptive) :
sensations of heat and cold on the skin, and of moisture or dryness
whether of the skin, eyes, mouth or other apertures, of flushing and
blanching or the prickling sensations of the hair rising; also the move-
ments of the face and of the muscles and joints of the trunk and limbs
and the sounds of our own voices. In varying combinations these
afferent elements contribute vivid sensory components to memory
which make the past with all the feelings it evokes as vivid and real as
though it were "here and now."
There are also the deeper components of sensation which come
from within the body (enteroceptive). These make further contribu-
tions to the affective or "gut" components of our memories of the past.
All of these enter into the re-experiencing of the past as though it were
occurring in the present; but again none of the contributing elements
need be conscious. These latent ingredients are ubiquitous in memory;
although in most remembering, words are a short-cutting device which
screens them out.
(4) This brings us to the usual re-experiencing of the past-as
something which is represented largely by verbal symbolic clues. Actu-
ally this is the least vivid element in the total process of memory; it
means remembering that something has happened to us, but almost as
impersonally as though it had happened to someone else. Words here
represent the past as from a safe distance, screening out all the more
vivid sensory components of memory. Thus memory of this usual
type actually involves a first step in dissociation and depersonalization.
Yet it is to just this type that the word "memory" is usually restricted:
namely, the memories which we represent by words. And these verbal
clues -to the past are themselves frequently experienced not accurately
but with many unconscious distortions, as through the substitution of
one memory for another or through the condensation of many similar
experiences to represent them by one "memory."
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These, then, are the major components of memory: the perceptual
components, the recording components, the processing components, the
reliving components and finally the components of representation by
means of verbal symbols. Each of these is vulnerable to distortions of
several kinds: (a) by deliberate conscious misrepresentation; (b) as
the result of subtle or gross organic changes in the central nervous
system (for example, the memory defects of senility, arteriosclerosis,
brain-damage, chronic alcoholism, infection); (c) by acute or chronic
disturbances in the biochemistry of the body as a whole (as in toxic
delirious states, hypoglycemic coma, drug effects) ; (d) by the influence
of affective processes which may be represented by emotions of which
we are fully conscious, but may also be sub-threshold processes some-
times even more potent -than conscious emotions in their influence on
the total constellation which comprises memory; (e) through the
influence of variations in levels of participation (as in the difference
between what we perceive or what we can relive or reproduce in sleep,
in the waking states or under hypnosis) or (f) through the influence of
those unconscious conflicts which are the origins of neurotic symptoms.
Most of these sources of error are not deliberate. Yet deliberate falsifi-
cations of memory, denials of remembered facts, substitutions of altered
facts are also possible and can be superimposed upon those guileless
sources of error which are inherent in human memory. Consequently,
errors are usually composite products of several of these processes.
Examples of such composite effects may be found in other types
of behavior. A soldier in training camp who is pathologically afraid of
his sergeant shoots himself in the foot. The act is deliberate but the
fright and the lack of control are not. These are products of deep
neurotic problems. The total constellation is a synthetic product of
conscious, preconscious and neurotogenic unconscious processes.
A man of high caliber, creative in many ways and valuable to his
community, is courageous, self-sacrificing, generous and meticulously
honest in most human relationships, but is guilty of destructive and
damaging behavior in his intimate life with women. In fact, he is al-
most incapable of telling women the truth. His father died and his
mother remarried at a time in his life which was critical in his emotional
development. Although in all other areas he is honorable, in this one
area of deeply traumatic early experiences with mother, step-father,
sister and nurse, he lies. Each such lie is deliberate and conscious.
Yet his vulnerability to automatic lying in -this one direction arises out
of unconscious conflicts which had their origins in childhood fears
and confusions.
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In spite of such complexities, each of which varies from individual
to individual, the legal fiction remains that what one -man remembers
accurately another who has shared the experience must also remember-
that the one who claims to forget or who, thinking he remembers,
reproduces an erroneous version of the incident experienced, is lying. I
wish that the problem was as simple as this, but it is not.
What then are the facts? No one remembers all of any event.
We do not remember the entire sequence of incidents which make up
the event itself, nor all of the people involved, the entire setting-time,
place and duration-nor the frequency of its repetition, nor the span
of time covered by -these repetitions. Yet in a court of law if there are
discrepancies between the testimonies given by two men about some
experience which they have shared, and if it is assumed or ascertainable
that the testimony of one is more nearly accurate than is the testimony
of the other, the more "correct" set of testimony is used as a measuring
rod to test not merely the accuracy but also the veracity of the other
man. This is an invalid test!
What is worse, the man who claims to remember most is usually
thought of as the more honest. He is "telling all." The other is
"holding back." This again is an indefensible assumption. No single
testimony should become the measure of what both "should" or "must"
recall. The failure to recall all that another claims to recall is not
evidence that the less complete or less accurate version constitutes
deliberate misrepresentation. In fact, instead of assuming that a less
complete or less accurate report implies voluntary distortion, suppres-
sion, hiding, evading or deliberate misleading, any claims for total or
precise recall should be regarded with equal suspicion, if not with more.
Therefore when in court anyone is asked, "Do you remember
Jones? How many times have you seen Jones? When and where did
you see Jones? Over how long a period have you known Jones?",
discrepancies between the answers of two or more men cannot fairly
or safely be used as a basis for charges of perjury. Anyone may give
answers which are contrary to fact without deliberate lying. Of course
he may be lying. Here is the rub. But he may also be answering the
truth, insofar as the truth is accessible to him, when he says that he
does not know whether he knows Jones, if and when they met, where
they met, how often, or over how long a period the contacts between
them were spread. To answer, "I do not know," or, "I cannot be sure,"
may be a deliberate deception or it may indicate a high determination to
tell only the truth. And this is the case even when another man
remembers or believes or pretends to recall far more about their joint
experiences.
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In one emotional state multiple experiences can be fused and then
be represented in memory as though they had been one event. This
happens constantly in childhood, as when a child may recall as a single
startling event something that may have happened a hundred times.
This is one form of what is called technically a "screen memory." Every
adult does this too. On the other hand, that same child or adult may
recall one single event as though it had happened many times. This is
another potential source of guileless discrepancies in juridical testimony.
There is a lesson to be learned here from mothers and their
children. Mothers live close to the growing lives of their children. Yet
unless they keep written daily diaries, few can reproduce accurately -the
dates and ages at which even the vitally important "firsts" occurred:
standing, walking, talking, school, illnesses and even more highly
charged events such as operations and accidents. Ask any pediatrican!
Nothing is harder to be sure of than the answer to such retrospective
"whens."
Finally, physical confrontation by another participant in a joint
experience may act as a trigger, starting a flow of impulses along as-
sociative pathways leading to a more complete reproduction or recollec-
tion of events, yet never necessarily uncovering them fully. This need
not always happen; but whether it happens or not does not carry any
necessary implication of deception.
These are only a few of the facts about memory and the tricks it
plays on all of us all the time, even when individuals are trying their
best to remember with accuracy and even in the absence of organic
brain disease. Under such circumstances to ask, "Do you or do you
not remember ?", to take the answer as indicative of the truthfulness or
dishonesty of the man who answers, and then to use an inaccurate
answer as a basis for an accusation of perjury is, to say the least,
dangerous. It violates clinical and experimental knowledge that has
been gained in the last seventy-five years. As a matter of fact, the
knowledge of this goes back even further. The great Charles Darwin
wrote that he had discovered that if he did not write down the observa-
tions which argued against his theories he always forgot them. He was
not trying to fool a court. But the conscious components of memory
were operating selectively under the influence of profound emotions.
If this happened to Darwin it can happen to every man, and our legal
procedures must learn how to take it into account.
False Memories
Up to this point we have considered only those distortions of
memory which manifest themselves in general memory losses or in
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special gaps or lapses. We have not included those false memories
which can arise as symptoms of the processes of mental illness and
whose potential influence must also be evaluated. Otherwise, discrep-
ancies between true and false memories may be wholly misleading to
judge and jury.
A few types and settings of such false memories may be noted as
examples. First, there are the stories which are made up out of
romantic, tragic, heroic or sympathy-compelling fantasies by men who
are slowly and imperceptibly losing their ability to distinguish between
their daydreams and reality. Such a man is described by Lord Dunsany
in the story entitled "The Strange Case of Mr. Shad." This is a not
infrequent phenomenon in the incipient phases of a schizophrenic illness.
In less fantastic forms it also plays a greater role in human life than is
usually realized. Nor are all such romances made up consciously.
Many arise for subtle and insidious reasons.
In certain situations these pseudological, carefully-thought-through
fantasies, called in their more extreme, elaborate and recurrent forms
"pseudologia fantastica," can assume quite realistic forms. They need
not be so extravagant as to be easily recognized. They can be mere
extrapolations from factual to imaginary experiences. Sometimes they
are as purposeless as is the kleptomania of the millionaire; but they
can also serve vicious, destructive and vengeful purposes.
Then there are the confabulations which people introduce to cover
gaps in memory. This is likely to happen when organic brain disease
has caused memory difficulties which are embarrassing but into which
the patient has insight and about which he is chagrined. He may then
fill in with made-up data which will sometimes consist of simple,
plausible anecdotes. A patient who has not been out of a hospital for
months may give a detailed account of a walk down the street, the
friends he met, the meals he ate, the movie he attended. These con-
fabulations can occur in the setting of any organic memory deficit, but
are characteristic of the condition known as Korsakow psychosis,
which arises not exclusively but most frequently among severe chronic
alcoholics with damage to certain areas of the brain.
Or such false memories may falsify only the frequency of some
event. In expansive moods five may become fifty, whereas in depressed
and shrunken moods fifty may be recalled as five. This misuse of the
decimal place need not be deliberate; it may occur as unconsciously as
it does in dreams.
Then there are the retrospective falsifications which are one of the
hallmarks of the fully developed paranoid condition. The man who has
delusions that he is being persecuted may feed those delusions by false
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memories of imaginary, yet possible, experiences with which he attempts
to prove to himself and to others the truth of his suspicions. A gesture
fifteen years ago by a stranger across the street, although not understood
at the time, suddenly becomes a signal from "them" that they are going
to take over and control his thoughts. Then comes a series of ten,
twenty, thirty examples of similar imaginary episodes all told in minute
and precise detail. Such accusations may have for the accuser the
quality of real experiences, as though he had dreamed them while awake
and without ability to distinguish between his fantasies and reality. Or
they may be conscious and deliberate and malicious lies.
Since in this setting the delusions of persecution may give rise to
intense hatred, the hate may color the retrospective falsifications so that
they become counter-accusations. Thus, false accusations may rest on
false memories, yet have much of the color of reality and be told with
intense feeling and apparent realism. Such false memories feed the
need for vengeance which not infrequently occurs in the paranoid
personality or the paranoid psychosis. The testimony of the recent and
repentant convert from Communism should be regarded with special
suspicion along these lines: he may be particularly eager to involve
others in his confessions in an effort to win favor and to clear his own
skirts, or out of the very illness which determined his original hatreds.
The "conversion" did not eliminate hatred from his soul; it just changed
the target.
There are also the false memories of those who need to make
sacrifices to expiate either rational or irrational guilt feelings. Some
of these unhappy people offer themselves up as sacrificial victims, as
for instance, the man who is laden with delusions of guilt and who gives
himself up to the police for a murder he could not possibly have com-
mitted. And some, in addition, must make sacrifices of other human
beings. Paradoxically enough, sometimes those who are most heavily
burdened with guilt may develop a pathological need to make a human
sacrifice of someone else, as though they could expiate their own guilt
by offering someone else upon the altar of the gods. They may sacrifice
those to whom they are close, with whom they may actually have been
associated, with whom they may iwwgine that they have been associated
or with whom they may have longed to be associated but by whom they
were rejected. The need to sacrifice another human being at the altar
of one's guilt-laden conscience is one of the difficult sources of memory
distortion which enter into all cases in which someone who has con-
fessed guilt of past crimes turns and accuses others, whether of private
offenses, criminal acts or acts of treason and subversion. This intro-
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duces a disturbing element of doubt as to the dependability of all such
testimony.
The Fallibility of Memories of Judge, Attorneys, and Jurors
Although I have so far discussed only the memory of the testifying
witness, we must not overlook the fact that this is only part of the story.
We must consider also the memories of the judge, of the attorneys for
both the prosecution and the defense, and of the jurors: what they
recall of everything that transpires in the courtroom is not to be taken
for granted. Yet we do take it for granted. We assume the accuracy
of the court stenographer's perceptions and of his recording of his
percepts. We assume that judges, attorneys and jurors as well perceive
and record accurately. Yet "accurately" implies more than a court
stenographer's transcript. It implies voice and intonation and manner
and expression.
It would be possible to subject all of these assumptions to test.
We no longer need to depend upon unaided memory. Testimony can
now be taped and screened. The judge, the attorneys, and the jury
could study the taping and the screening of the testimony, studying it
over and over if necessary to catch nuances of voice, expression and
gesture. It was not possible to do this until recent years, but it is
possible today, and without too great expense. One wonders how much
error and how much honest disagreement could be eliminated by the
use of such simple devices alone. One wonders also how much error of
interpretation could be eliminated if the triers had more than a single
fleeting chance to study, observe and listen to a witness as he gives his
testimony: to study his voice and manner not once but repeatedly by
replaying his recorded testimony, watching for possible tell-tale hints of
falsification, confusion, dissimulation and confabulation.
And if for a moment we consider the processes of appeal, how
illuminating would be an appeal based upon a re-examination of the
taped and screened record of the original proceedings! To demonstrate
the actual behavior of trial participants, judge, attorneys and jury might
well reveal more than the tidied-up or slanted versions of recorded
percept or of memory.
I do not for a moment pretend to offer solutions to any of the
problems I have raised. I am suggesting only that devices are available
today which, properly applied, could make a court into an instrument of
objective inquiry and which might free it from some of the errors of
the past. But this will not be done so long as we are complacent about
the dependability of honest memory, for memory remains immensely
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fallible even when every effort is made to tell the whole truth and noth-
ing but the truth. Let me, therefore, end by giving a few examples of
the kinds of inter-disciplinary research which might illuminate some of
these unsolved issues.
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
I will not attempt here to review systematically all the possible
experimental approaches to these problems. I will limit myself to a
few illustrations of investigations which might be fruitful. In all of
these studies the design is essentially simple and constant: to attempt to
record for minute study the unintended ingredients in speech, expres-
sion, manner and mannerism of accuser, accused, witness, judge,
attorneys, and jurors. This would be done preliminarily in artificial
facsimiles of legal processes and subsequently in screenings and record-
ings of actual courtroom proceedings with the first objective of ascer-
taining whether these would provide dependable indices of deliberate
deception as opposed to unconscious and involuntary error. A second
objective would be to test the accuracy of memory and its reproduction
under experimental situations. For these purposes it would be neces-
sary to collect a large and varied array of old cases with complete
stenographic records. These would have to be of three kinds: (a)
cases in which judge and jury had made definite decisions the accuracy
of which had been confirmed by subsequent developments over the
years; (b) cases in which the accuracy of the judgments had been
disproved over the course of years; and (c) cases in which for one
reason or another, inability to reach any decision had resulted in
dismissal. These records of old cases would be used as scripts for a
series of mock trials in which a certain number of witnesses would be
schooled to give honest and accurate answers upon direct and cross-
examination. Other witnesses would be falsely instructed, so that they
would give honest but misleading answers. A third group would be
instructed to give consciously false answers. The behavior and speech
of all would be recorded and screened.2
From these recordings and films, it should then be possible to study
the processes of deception by comparison of the behavior of those
persons who are giving answers which they know to be true with the
2 A similar experimental paradigm might be appropriate to an investigation of
the role of the attorney in the trial process. In an adversary system it is the attorney's
duty to present his case in a form which is as favorable as possible to his client.
Inevitably, this produces a certain amount of slanting. If we are to test the assump-
tion that an adversary system is the best system by which to approximate truth in
legal procedures, then we should compare the results achieved in mock trials in which
some attorneys "advocate," while others present their case in a non-partisan manner.
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behavior of those whose answers they alone know to be false, under
circumstances where the veracity of each is under suspicion. It would
be possible to create greater emotional impact in this situation by
promising sizable rewards to those witnesses who succeed in convincing
judge and jury of their truthfulness: both to those whose deliberate
deceptions are not detected and to those whose "true" testimony is
believed. Then, by the repeated study of pictures, sometimes in slow
motion, an appraisal of every aspect of speech, posture, facial expression,
hand-gesture, eye-movements, breathing, etc., might be made.
The basis of such studies is in sharp contrast to the basis of the
so-called lie detectors. The principle of these latter consists in an
erroneous assumption :-that there is a specific relationship between any
one emotion and those autonomic discharges which are connected with
emotional -states. In reality an individual can have the same autonomic
discharge when he is telling the truth under stress as when he is telling
a lie under stress. It is not the truth or the lie but the stress, common
to both, which is linked to emotional processes. On the other hand,
there are organs other than those of speech by which we do communi-
cate meaning to the outside world, mainly preconsciously-eyebrows,
nose, eyes, the skin of our cheeks, mouths, hands, fingers, breathing.
These organs of communication have never been adequately studied.
There are a few slow-motion pictures of the apparently random repeti-
tive movements of children which have shown that at least in a high
proportion of instances -the movement is in fact not random, but has a
clear and transparent meaning which becomes understandable only if the
picture is run slowly enough so that one can analyze the movements in
detail.
When a judge, attorney or juror observes a man who is testifying,
he normally concentrates primarily on the face and eyes. From the
rest of the witness' body he receives only a few hints. As a result much
of the unspoken language is unseen and unheard; it is like the four
rings in a five-ring circus that go unseen because one is focussing all
attention on the center ring. This is familiar to all of us. It is this
tendency which the stage magician exploits by drawing the attention
of the audience to one hand so that they will not notice what the other
hand is doing. This we do automatically as we observe witnesses. But
until systematic screenings and tape recordings of witness behavior are
studied it will be impossible for anyone to predict to what extent tell-
tale indications of deception or of dissimulation or of partial truth may
be discernible from this body language with statistically greater ac-
curacy than words alone provide.
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After studies are made of these processes of communication in
such facsimile situations, it should-be possible to make similar record-
ings and similar screenings of the behavior of witnesses in actual court
proceedings, not for the public press or for the public consumption, but
for further experimental investigation. With the help of infra-red film
it should be possible to do this without flooding the courtroom with
excessive lighting.
A next step in such an investigation would be to contrast the re-
sults of direct and cross-examination conducted in open courtroom with
the results of direct and cross-examination in isolated, tte- -t~te inter-
views in which total recording by tape and film is made. In the past it
was impossible to preserve a full record of an interview other than by
reliance on the fallible percepts and memory of the court stenographer.
Therefore there were good reasons for examining an individual only
in the open courtroom: the possibilities of -intimidation or bribery which
might occur in a closed interview cast constant doubt as to the validity
of testimony elicited t~te-A-tfte. But when a closed interview is con-
ducted in a special room wired for sound and lighted for screening, a
total record of everything that transpires can be secured; and it should
be easy to make further provision to assure against subsequent tamper-
ing, through procedures insulating the recording machines and their
product.
I would emphasize again my earlier statement that these sugges-
tions are intended only to illustrate some of the types of investigation
which might be undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team of lawyers,
clinical psychologists and psychiatrists and which might be expected to
throw light on some of the problems of juridical testimony. We will
not attempt to describe here the kind of research institute in psychiatry
and legal procedure which would be needed to staff, finance and conduct
such investigations.
I cannot close this section on the experimental approach without
emphasizing again the importance of studying the process of appeal by
similar devices. Appeals based on astute arguments from the cold
record by partisan advocates are one thing. Appeals based on the
actual study of recordings of court procedures might be quite another.
The devices which I have described in this section would make possible
a direct study by appellate judges of the relevant behavior of all parties
to the trial. A systematic comparison of the outcome of such appeals as
conducted in these two ways should not be postponed indefinitely.
Finally, research into the procedures by which testimony is elicited
and evaluated must include basic research on processes of speech. Yet
words are only one ingredient in the comnunication and disguise of
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thoughts and feelings. Their implications are subject to subtle modu-
lations which are expressed by variations in volume, pitch, intonation,
pronunciation, stress, rhythm, voice placement, resonance, such affec-
tive elements as hints of moaning, groaning, whining, smiling, and
the rhythmical or arhythmical grouping of words into word clusters
with silent gaps or into a continuous and unmodulated stream. For such
studies precise registration will be needed of decibels of volume, of time
intervals, and even of the motion of the air-volume in breathing and in
speech. These modulations are themselves so brief and follow each
other so swiftly that the duration of many of them approximate the
subliminal durations used in tachistoscopic experiments. Consequently,
the perception of -them depends upon preconscious recognitive processes
and constitutes another example of the fact that in language there is a
stream of preconscious processing of which words provide only a
fragmentary conscious sample. In addition to words, patterns of
mimetic facial and body movements constitute the para-linguistic com-
ponents of language. These components, explored under the term
kinomorphic analysis, are charged with potentially ascertainable
meaning.
Because it is artificial to isolate any one of these elements from the
total technique of communication, analysis of language and of the
multiple components of the communicative process as it operates in
direct and cross-examination conducted both in the courtroom and in
isolation will be an important element in the studies carried on by any
law school which wants not merely to teach what has been practiced in
the past but also to find new and better ways for the future. This will
add new dimensions to the studies which will engross investigators
who explore the processes of law in the future.*
* Certain references vill serve as leads into the literature: 1 & 2 RAPAPORT,
DIAGNOSTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING (Menninger Clinic Monograph Series Nos. 3
and 4, 1945, 1946) (the data on memory, retention, recall and reproduction appear
in many places throughout these two volumes) ; RAPAI'ORT, EMOTIONS AND MEMORY
(2d ed. 1950); WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT INTELLI-
GENCE (4th ed. 1958); Birdwhistell, Background to Kinesics, 13 ETC.: A REVIEW OF
GENERAL SEMANTICS 10 (1955) ; Birdwhistell, Introduction to Kinesics, Dept. of State,
Foreign Service Institute, 1952.
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